TOKYO, June 27 (Xinhua) -- Earlier this month, Hiroshi Kamiwaki, a constitutional law professor at Japan's Kobe Gakuin University, filed a complaint with prosecutors, accusing Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of making false entries in political funding reports in violation of the political funds control law.

This is not the first time Takaichi has been embroiled in a political funds scandal. Nor do the scandals expose merely the misconduct of a handful of politicians like Takaichi. They reveal the deep-rooted structural flaws of "money politics" fostered under the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) long-term rule.

In recent years, Japan's right-wing conservative forces have been pushing for greater military buildup and steering the country toward neo-militarism, behind which also lies collusion between politicians and the defense industry.

DISMISSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL FUNDING SCANDALS

According to Kamiwaki, after examining internal funds reports from Takaichi's office and reviewing interviews conducted by the weekly magazine Shukan Bunshun, the newspaper Shimbun Akahata, and other Japanese media, he found that Takaichi's office may have recorded funds paid by corporate executives for political fundraising party tickets as individual political donations.

The distinction matters: Purchases of political fundraising party tickets are not eligible for income tax deductions, whereas personal donations are. If the allegations are substantiated, the conduct could constitute not only making false entries in political funding reports but also aiding tax evasion in violation of Japan's Income Tax Act.

Takaichi's political funding problems are nothing new. She has previously faced allegations of manipulating funds from an LDP chapter in Nara Prefecture, which she heads, by disguising them as personal political donations and exploiting a political donation refund mechanism to obtain illicit gains. In 2012 alone, she reportedly received around 3 million yen (around 18,550 U.S. dollars) in refunds.

She was also accused of failing to record 8.75 million yen in political funds reports between 2012 and 2013, and omitting 1.5 million yen in party subsidies from the LDP headquarters in 2021.

In August 2024, her LDP chapter in Nara allegedly received a 10 million yen donation from a Tokyo-based company, exceeding the maximum allowed by law for that particular type of donor.

Some critics have linked Takaichi's repeated entanglement in political funds controversies to her dismissive attitude toward such matters.

During the February House of Representatives election campaign, the Takaichi-led LDP endorsed 43 politicians implicated in the party's "slush fund scandal" as official candidates.

When opposition lawmakers questioned her on the matter, Takaichi argued that "a politician should not be disqualified from remaining in office just because of a single reporting omission or mistake." Opposition parties criticized her for showing no genuine reflection on the "slush fund scandal."

DEEP-ROOTED "MONEY POLITICS"

Analysts say that Takaichi's recurring political funding controversies and her lenient attitude toward those involved in the "slush fund scandal" are not merely personal issues, but a manifestation of the LDP's deeply entrenched "culture" of "money politics."

"Money politics" has deep roots in Japan. Although the political funds control law was enacted in 1948, it stopped short of explicitly banning political donations from corporations and organizations, leaving the door open for political-business collusion.

Corporations and organizations funnel money to political parties and politicians through donations, helping them win elections. In return, parties and politicians leverage their power to advance the interests of their donors through industrial policies, government procurement, and other means.

Having ruled Japan for most of the postwar period, the LDP has been the biggest player and beneficiary of "money politics," with party operations inextricably tied to political donations.

In the 1970s and 1980s, "money politics" ran rampant in Japan, and serious corruption scandals were repeatedly exposed under LDP rule.

Although Japan has since strengthened oversight of political donations through legal amendments, "money politics" has never been effectively curbed, as evidenced by the "slush fund scandal" that came to light in November 2023.

In the wake of the scandal, the LDP has continued to resist opposition calls for a total ban on corporate and organizational political donations, claiming that such entities also have the right to freedom of political activities.

Koji Nakakita, a professor at Japan's Chuo University, noted that the series of political funding controversies in recent years has exposed the deep-seated problems within the LDP's outdated organizational system.

KEY DRIVER OF NEO-MILITARISM

"Money politics" not only underpins the LDP's party operations and prolonged grip on power, but also shapes the policy direction of both the party and the Japanese government.

In recent years, Japan has accelerated its military buildup, including substantially increasing defense spending, aggressively developing offensive weaponry, and lifting the ban on exports of lethal arms. Behind these moves lies the shadow of collusion between politics and business.

According to Shimbun Akahata, at least 12 of the top 20 Japanese companies with the largest Defense Ministry procurement contracts in fiscal 2024 made political donations to the LDP, totaling more than 220 million yen. The top five by procurement volume were Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, and Fujitsu.

Tansa, a Japanese investigative website, revealed that MHI has long been a political donor to the LDP, contributing a cumulative total of about 820 million yen between 1990 and 2022, including at least 33 million yen annually from 2020 to 2022.

In late 2022, Japan revised its three key security documents, setting total defense spending for fiscal 2023-2027 at 43 trillion yen, 1.6 times the level of the previous five-year period. Meanwhile, MHI's defense-related orders in fiscal 2023 reached 1.68 trillion yen, 4.6 times the figure from the previous fiscal year.

In February 2024, an MHI senior executive reportedly participated in a government meeting on the "reinforcement of defense capabilities." One of the meeting's recommendations was to further increase defense budgets.

The arrangement drew criticism from Kiyomi Tsujimoto, a lawmaker from the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, who questioned whether it was appropriate for defense contractors to be brought into policy discussions and given massive government orders while the LDP receives political donations from them.

"Isn't that effectively a kickback?" she asked.

In April, the Takaichi government lifted the ban on exports of lethal weapons. Many media reports pointed out that one of the primary purposes of the move was to open up overseas markets for Japan's defense industry, providing a significant boost to relevant companies.

Analysts have drawn a pointed historical parallel: Before World War II, Japanese conglomerates known as "zaibatsu" colluded with the government and military to drive the country's rampant overseas aggression and expansion, bringing tremendous suffering to people in Japan, across Asia, and beyond. These conglomerates, meanwhile, reaped enormous profits.

Today, they argue, Japan's defense companies are using political donations to forge close ties with parties and politicians, driving Japan's headlong rush down the path of neo-militarism, a trend that warrants vigilance from the international community. ■